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What should we expect from Switzerland’s compulsory dental insurance reform? 
Abstract 
Background A vast and heated debate is arising in Switzerland as a result of some recent citizens' 
initiatives aimed at introducing compulsory dental health care insurance. The Grand Conseils of the Vaud, 
Geneva, and Neuchâtel cantons recently approved three public initiatives and their citizens are expected to 
vote on the proposal in 2018. The process of collecting signatures has begun in several other cantons and the 
discussion has now moved to a national level.  
Discussion At present, there is no scientific research that can help policy-makers and citizens to 
understand the main economic implications of such reform. We attempt to fill this gap by analysing three 
critical issues: the level and determinants of unmet needs for dental care in Switzerland; the protection of 
vulnerable individuals; and the economic sustainability of reform.  
Results and short conclusions The results show that income is not a unique determinant of barriers to 
access to dental care but rather, cultural and socio-demographic factors impact the perceived level of unmet 
dental care needs. The reform might only partially, if at all, improve the equity of the current system. In 
addition, the results show that the 1% wage-based contribution that the reform promoters suggest should 
finance the insurance is inadequate to provide full and free dental care to Swiss residents, but is merely 
sufficient to guarantee basic preventive care, whereas this could be provided by dental hygienists for less.  












Disparities in oral health and in the access to dental care dominate the international literature on the 
topic. The financial burden of out-of-pocket dental care expenditure gained attention due to its affordability 
and weight in household budgets because dental care is typically not covered by insurance schemes or it is 
at a lower level. Several studies show that children (Manski et al., 2001; Dye et al., 2010), individuals with 
special needs (Owens et al., 2006), elderly people (Stadelmann et al., 2011; Guessous et al., 2014), people 
living in rural areas (Skillman et al., 2010) and low-income individuals generally (Vargas and Ronzio, 2006) are 
more affected by oral diseases, such as dental caries and periodontitis. In addition, racial and ethnic 
minorities tend to experience disparities in oral health status (Flores and Tomany-Korman, 2008). These 
disparities might be considered a consequence partially of being intrinsic to the socio-demographic group 
and partially of the barriers to dental care access. Disadvantaged socio-demographic groups (e.g. low-income 
individuals and ethnic minorities) are less likely to have private dental coverage (Manski et al., 2002; Pourat, 
2008) while dental care is barely included in social programmes. In several countries, being part of the labour 
force is strongly predictive of having dental coverage (Manski et al., 2010). For example, in the US, dental 
insurance is excluded from the Medicare programme and medical insurance is 2.5 times more common than 
dental insurance; elderly Americans are often excluded from coverage because their employer-based 
insurance coverage expires when they retire (Kreider et al., 2014). Consequently, middle-aged groups tend 
to record higher levels of coverage while elderly people out of the labour force tend to be excluded from 
coverage (Millar and Locker, 1999). In addition, the impact of oral health on the probability of receiving dental 
care is controversial: according to Bhatti et al. (2007), people with poor oral health are less likely to use dental 
services, and this is probably the reason for their poor oral health but, among those using dental services, 
people with poor oral health tend to visit dentists more often than those with good oral health. Listl et al. 
(2014), using Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) data for a selection of European 
countries, found that reasons for dental non-attendance are different in different countries. In most 
countries (e.g. Italy, Spain, Greece, and Germany), several people do not use dental care because they 
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perceive it as unnecessary; in other countries, a high percentage of people declare they do not use dental 
services because they are not affordable.  
Given these considerations, previous research identified the presence of insurance as a key factor 
associated with the ‘use’ and ‘non-use’ of dental care. In general, having insurance seems to increase the use 
of dental services significantly, as it reduces the perceived price of care (Mueller and Monheit, 1988; Manski 
et al., 2002; Manski and Brown, 2008; Pourat, 2009; AHRQ, 2010; Decker, 2011). However, it is not clear if 
the relationship is causal or if greater need leads patients to obtain insurance (AHRQ, 2010; Listl, 2015). 
Kreider et al. (2014) highlighted the relevance of the selection problem that emerges when analysing the 
impact of insurance on dental care use: indeed, seeking dental care and obtaining insurance might be driven 
by unobserved factors (e.g. aversion to risk and expectations of future needs), making the relationship 
spurious. For this reason, recent approaches (Munkin and Trivedi, 2007; Cooper et al., 2012; Kreider et al., 
2014) have tended to use econometric specifications that can deal with the selection bias problem and have 
still produced results consistent with the previous ones.  
In addition, differences in the use pattern of dental care might be caused by the different characterization 
of ‘private’ (i.e. offered through employers or other organizations) and ‘public’ systems (i.e. state-run). In 
‘private systems’, buying health insurance different from the plan offered by an employer usually costs more, 
as there is no cost sharing with the employer. On the other hand, public health insurance is a government 
insurance system that pays the healthcare provider for medical care. Manning et al. (1985) proposed an 
analysis on the effect on dental care use of different insurance schemes (free or co-insured by out-of-pocket 
expenditure by families). The authors found that passing from a 25% coinsurance rate to free dental coverage 
increased the probability of using dental services from 53.6% to 68.7%. Consistent results have been obtained 
by Mueller and Monheit (1988), who also claimed that the increase in demand consequent to extending 
insurance is particularly relevant for expensive dental services (e.g. bridges and crowns) but less evident for 
basic treatments (e.g. X-rays and cleaning) that are consumed regardless of insurance status. This means that 
insurance tends to change the mix of dental services consumed.  
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During the last 2 years, the Swiss dental care system has been placed at the centre of a heated debate 
concerning a reform proposal to introduce compulsory dental care insurance (di Bella et al., 2017). The 
proponents of reform suggest financing dental insurance through a 1% contribution to wages based on the 
model of the Assurance Vieillesse et Survivants, a compulsory insurance intended to support retired people 
and the pensions of widows and widowers. The contribution should be equally divided between the employer 
and employee, although each canton might decide to impose a different financing principle. In the current 
system, dental care is not included in the healthcare system, except for costs generated by serious and 
unavoidable diseases of the masticatory system or by another serious illness or its aftermath. According to 
the Swiss Federal Office of Statistics, in Switzerland, the total cost of dental care in 2014 amounted to 4.1 
billion Swiss francs (CHF), equivalent, on average, to approximately 492 CHF per capita per year. Patients 
themselves directly pay 90% of all dental care costs while the remainder is covered by social and private 
insurance or other regimes (Confédération Suisse, 2014). In the European framework, Switzerland ranks first 
in the level of out-of-pocket expenditure for dental care (Saekel, 2016). According to Listl et al. (2014), in 
Switzerland, 28.4% of non-users of dental services perceive dental care as too expensive; this percentage is 
the highest recorded among the countries analysed and Switzerland's neighbouring countries record 
definitely lower percentages (e.g. Austria = 11.1%; Germany = 4.4 %; Italy = 18.4%; and France = 18.5%). A 
recent study by Guessous et al. (2014) applied to survey data in the Canton of Geneva found that the 
prevalence of forgoing dental care is highly dependent on income level. 
Between 2014 and 2016, three popular initiatives for reform of the current system were proposed in three 
cantons (Neuchâtel, Vaud, and Geneva) and the Grand Conseils of these cantons validated the initiatives so 
that the votation to determine citizens’ views on the reform will presumably take place by 2018. In the 
meantime, several other cantons are preparing popular initiatives on this subject. Thus, the debate is moving 
to national level with the following two main positions at stake. On the one hand, the proponents of the 
reform maintain that it will bring redistributive effects that will benefit the vulnerable part of society and 
that it will promote equitable access to dental care (Madrid et al., 2009). In particular, the promoters of the 
reform claim that low-income individuals tend to be excluded from private dental care (e.g. Guessous et al., 
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2014) and that the introduction of a mandatory insurance scheme might improve access to dental care for 
individuals currently experiencing economic barriers to access dental services. Moreover, according to the 
proponents, easier access to dental care would improve prevention and check-up visits, thereby reducing 
long-run problems. On the other hand, opponents of the proposal, led by the Swiss Dental Association 
(Société Suisse d'Odonto-Stomatologie, SSO), do not favour compulsory dental coverage because they do not 
consider it the proper response to the inequity in dental care access. Rather, they consider that it would 
inflate the bureaucracy of the system and have undesirable effects, such as a substantial decrease in dental 
care quality and excess demand. Furthermore, the SSO is concerned that the reform would release many 
patients from their responsibility for taking care of their teeth by means of adequate preventive oral hygiene. 
This debate is a novelty in the Swiss context and international experiences about the introduction of 
compulsory dental insurance within the last 2 decades are rare. Some evidence on the impact of recent dental 
reforms have been proposed in Thailand ( Somkotra and Detsomboonrat, 2008), Israel (Quiñonez, 2016),  and 
Chile (Cornejo-Ovalle et al., 2015); however, results are not consistent in terms of impact of improving 
coverage on dental care utilization and inequalities. Consequently, the actual impact of this reform is not 
clear or easy to predict. This debate is a rare phenomenon in which dental care policy is being discussed at 
all levels and is of widespread interest for policy-makers to find new solutions. This study attempts to assess 
the feasibility and impact of providing free and comprehensive dental benefit to the general population of 
Switzerland focusing in particular on two critical issues of the reform proposal: 
1) Is the reform proposal justified by the presence of relevant barriers to access dental care in 
Switzerland? 
2) Can the suggested scheme for financing dental insurance guarantee the economic sustainability of 
the reform? 
The Swiss healthcare system is particularly complex owing to the sharing of decision-making powers 
among three different stakeholders: three levels of government (i.e. confederation, cantons, and 
municipalities), corporatist bodies (including insurance companies and healthcare providers), and Swiss 
citizens, who can pervasively influence health policy-making through veto and popular initiatives. The 
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scheme of financing the Swiss healthcare has been found to be one of the most regressive within the OECD 
countries (Wagstaff and Van Doorslaer, 1992; 1999; Van Doorslaer and Wagstaff, 1992; Bilger, M., 2008; De 
Pietro et al., 2015). Consequently, the reform proposal can be justified by a reduction in the unfairness of the 
entire healthcare system by reforming the financing scheme and reducing the perceived cost of dental 
services for vulnerable individuals. At the moment, four forms of financing co-exist (for a more in-depth 
description, see Crivelli and Salari, 2012; De Pietro et al., 2015): Mandatory Health Insurance (MHI), 
government subsidies and benefits, General Social Insurance, and household expenditure. Since 1996, the 
MHI has been in existence to cover a comprehensive basket of healthcare services fixed at the federal level. 
The MHI services included in the benefits package have to be simple, economical, and appropriate (Loi 
fédérale sur l'assurance-maladie, LAMal). Households pay monthly premiums for private insurance, which 
are differentiated across three age classes but not by income; households can choose different insurance 
programmes (characterized by higher or lower premiums) depending on the level of deducible and maximum 
coverage. Premiums are set at the regional level by each health insurer and consequently, they are 
significantly different across regions and cantons. In addition, households pay directly for healthcare services 
through out-of-pocket expenditure, deductions (about 330 CHF, in the standard contract), co-payments, and 
voluntary complementary insurance. As insurance premiums and household expenditure are not dependent 
on income level, these two forms of financing are regressive. The state, through lower tiers of 
jurisdictions/local governments, finances a further component of healthcare expenditure by providing 
subsides to low-income households so that premiums do not exceed 10% of household income, although 
different eligibility rules are set in different cantons. This contribution is financed through a mixed system 
using direct taxation (progressive but different across cantons) and indirect taxation through value-added tax 
(regressive). Depending on the proportion of the two taxes, the overall impact of this source could be 
regressive, progressive, or even proportional (Crivelli and Salari, 2012). Lastly, general social insurance 
provides benefits connected to pensions, disability, and accidents. As the social contribution rate paid by 




Dental care is covered free of charge if it concerns a serious non-preventable illness of the masticatory 
system or if it is caused by genetic anomalies. In particular, basic treatments (scaling and root planning, 
decays treatment, teeth extraction, endodontic treatments, removable prosthesis if less than 20 teeth are in 
contact between the two arches and all the treatments that are a consequence of genetic problems or 
diseases such as cancers, granulomas, etc.) are allowed by LAMal, which makes provision for all these basic 
treatments for indigent peoplei. ‘Luxury’ or advanced treatments (fixed prosthodontic: crown onlay/overlay, 
implants, bleaching, micro-abrasions, orthodontic treatments, etc.) are not covered by LAMal and they are 
fully paid out-of-pocket. In state schools, children’s teeth are checked for free once a year. Although the 
check-ups are free of charge, if the child requires any treatment for tooth decay, the parents must pay but 
some local cantonal authorities subsidize the cost of necessary dental treatment with special reductions (up 
to 80% refund of dental fees) according to the different cantonal laws. 
The pricing schema of privately supplied dental treatments differ substantially from that applied to 
treatments covered by LAMal. In general, tariffs for each treatment are not arbitrarily established or 
negotiated politically but their amount are based on a cost criterion that takes into account personnel costs, 
operating expenses, and investment costs. Since 1976, a price list of more than 500 dental services has been 
published by the Swiss Dental Association and each tariff is determined as the product of two components: 
the number of points attributable to each treatment (PP) (that depends on the type of the treatment) and 
the value of each tariff point (VTP)  according to the self-estimated skill and expertise of the dentistii. For 
treatments covered by LAMal the value of each tariff point is set, for simplicity, to 3.1 CHF, whereas the value 
of each tariff point for privately supplied treatments ranges between 3.1 and 5.8 CHF. Therefore, the pricing 
scheme applied to privately supplied treatments allows to take into account, on the one hand, the particular 
circumstances of the patients (urgency, comfort, aesthetics, quality) and, on the other, the particularities of 
the dental practice (infrastructure costs, wages)iii. Five minutes of basic dental treatment of a professional 
dentist correspond to 9 tariff points (PP = 9); therefore, the basic hourly cost of a Swiss dentist ranges from 
335 CHF (if VTP = 3.10) to 626 CHF (if VTP = 5.8). Conversely, under the LAMal regime, no adjustments in 
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price are allowed depending on patient’s condition, on dentist’s experience or on materials used and the 
hourly wage equals 335 CHF (i.e.: VTP = 3.10). 
Data and Methods 
Different datasets and methods have been used to answer the two research questions posed. Due to the 
large share of out-of-pocket expenditure in dental care, the vast administrative databases are not helpful in 
the evaluation of the actual impact of the Swiss reform and there is a substantial paucity of data. Therefore, 
the main sources of information that we used for this study are three Swiss surveys: the Swiss Household 
Paneliv (year 2014), the Swiss Labour Force Survey (year 2015) and the Swiss Earnings Structure Survey (year 
2014). The former dataset has been used to evaluate the presence of barriers to access dental care (1st 
research question), whereas the last two surveys are employed in the analysis of the economic sustainability 
of the reform (2nd research question). 
The principal aim of the Swiss Household Panel (SHP) is to observe social change, in particular the 
dynamics of changing living conditions and representations in the population of Switzerland. The survey, run 
in 16 waves between 1999 and 2014, contains a set of questions concerning several aspects of daily activity 
and of the financial situation of a subset of Swiss households (7,517 households and 18,021 individuals in 
2014)v. Two of the questions are of interest for our analysis on barriers to access dental care: ‘Are you or any 
other member of your household able to go to the dentist if needed?’ and ‘If no, is it because you cannot 
afford to do it or for another reason?’. The analysis of this data allows us to trace the situation within the 
different Swiss cantons and to highlight the heterogeneity of dental unmet needs across the country. To 
identify the determinants of reported unmet dental needs, we performed four logistic regressions on the 
SHP data (year 2014) using different sets of covariates to describe the ‘socio-economic status’ of households. 
In particular, we run four regressions to decompose the impact of the different covariates on the level of 
unmet needs for dental care: 1) income alone (Model 1); 2) region of residence alone (Model 2); 3) income 
and region of residence (Model 3); and 4) a set of socio-economic determinants of the household (i.e. number 
of members; if it is located in a rural area; its average educational level; labour status of its members; and 
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nationality of its members) plus income and regional dummies (Model 4). Table 1 presents a detailed 
description of the variables included in the modellingvi.  
<TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
In order to give an economic evaluation of the actual sustainability of the Swiss reform we made use of 
the data from the other two surveys of the Swiss Statistical Office. The Swiss Labour Force Survey (SLFS) is a 
telephone survey based on a sample of some 105,000 interviews sent out to individuals every year. The main 
purpose of the SLFS is to provide information on the structure of the labour force and employment behaviour 
patterns. The Swiss Earnings Structure Survey (ESS) is a written survey of approximately 35,000 private and 
public enterprises or administrations with some 1.6 million employees (situation for the 2014 ESS), carried 
out every two years in enterprises in Switzerland. It allows a regular description to be made of the earnings 
structure in all economic activities of the secondary and tertiary sectors based on representative data. Using 
data from SLFS and ESS we obtain and estimate of the 1% wage-based contributions to finance the insurance 
system. The Swiss Federal Statistical Office provides information on only three quartiles of income 
distributions: by age class and gender. Using median income as a reference for the computations might lead 
to serious underestimation of the total 1% contribution. Consequently, we decided to estimate average 
income by age, class, and gender, estimating for each group a log-normal income distribution and using the 
corresponding mean as a reference for our computations. 
 
Results 
According to the SHP data, on average, 4.1% of Swiss households reported unmet needs for dental care 
in 2014, but a preliminary, descriptive, analysis of the data clearly shows that the level of unmet needs is not 
uniformly distributed across the cantons (Table 2). For example, Ticino and Lake Geneva regions report the 
highest levels of unmet dental needs (9.3% and 7.8%, respectively), whereas Zurich and Central Switzerland 
regions record the lowest values (2.7% and 1.7%, respectively). It is undeniable that income plays a role in 
these percentages; Ticino records the highest percentage of households in the first quartile (lowest income) 
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of Swiss income distribution (39%), followed by Lake Geneva (27%) and East Switzerland (27%). However, 
income is not the sole factor that can justify the different levels of unmet needs across Switzerland. 20% of 
households living in Lake Geneva region reported unmet dental needs, while this percentage accounts for 
only 4% in the cantons of Central Switzerland (Table 2, third column). These disparities, not directly ascribable 
to income differences, might instead be caused by other socio-economic factors, such as educational level 
and nationality. If we consider the distribution of unmet needs by nationality, we observe that among 
households composed by at least one foreigner, 8.11% reported unmet dental needs compared to 2.4% of 
Swiss households. In addition, people reporting unmet dental needs have, on average, fewer average years 
of education.  
<TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
Table 3 gives the results of the four estimated logistic regression models described in Table 1, while a 
comparison of their goodness of fit using the receiver operating characteristics (ROC) area is given in Figure 
1.  
<TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE> 
 
Model 1 (ROC area = 0.77) shows that the higher income is, the lower is the probability of experiencing 
unmet needs. The six regional dummies in Model 2 (ROC area = 0.62) turn out to be significant, indicating 
that, compared to the Lake Geneva reference region, the probability of reporting unmet needs for dental 
care increases for those families living in the region of Ticino but decreases for all other regions. Model 3 
(ROC area = 0.78), which combines income and regional dummies, brings an improvement in the goodness 
of fit compared to Model 1. The addition of other socio-economic drivers in Model 4 (ROC area = 0.82) further 
improves the explanatory capacity of the model. In particular, the probability of reporting unmet dental 
needs increases in households in which at least one member is unemployed or of foreign nationality; 
therefore, unemployment and foreign nationality might be considered risk factors, in accordance with the 
international literature. In addition, having a higher educational level impacts negatively on the probability 
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of reporting unmet dental needs. Living in rural areas negatively affects the level of unmet needs; this factor 
is in contrast to previous research (Skillman et al., 2010).  
<FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
A crucial aspect in evaluating a reform is its economic sustainability, that is, if the resources to be made 
available by the reform are adequate to cover the new expenses. Table 4 reports the 2014 Swiss workforce 
in thousands of units and the estimated average gross monthly salary for October 2015 by age and gender. 
Using average income by age class and gender, estimating for each group a log-normal income distribution 
and using the corresponding mean as a reference for our computations, we compute the expected 
contributions derivable from the 1% withdrawal. We obtain an estimate of 3.5 billion CHF, that is 600 million 
CHF less than the dental care expenses reported by the Swiss Federal Office of Statistics in 2014. This is 
equivalent to 430 CHF per capita per year (85% of actual dental care expenditure). Since basic dental 
treatment is already guaranteed to all individuals, a reform of the current system could be justified only if 
the financing plan for the new insurance scheme would significantly improve the basket of guaranteed dental 
services; however, given the estimations, improving the basket of guaranteed dental services does not seem 
possible through the suggested financing scheme. 
Discussion 
According to the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, in 2014, households directly covered roughly 68% of the 
total cost of healthcare financing (through premiums and direct household expenditure) and 90% of dentists’ 
cost (through out-of-pocket expenditure). As stated earlier, the largest part of the total cost of healthcare 
and an even the largest part of dental care expenditure is financed through a regressive type of contribution. 
The introduction of a contribution for dental care proportional to income (and half covered by employers) is 
likely to change the financial burden borne by low-income households; in the post-reform financing scheme, 
a new proportional contribution would indeed replace a regressive source of financing, decreasing the 
regressivity level of the whole system. Even if the available datasets are not sufficient to assess what kind of 
dental services are most demanded depending on the income level, it should be considered that most 
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international literature is concordant in assessing that, even when freely provided, dental healthcare services 
(particularly the specialist ones) are more intensively used/demanded by people with a higher than average 
level of income. Consequently, it cannot be taken for granted that the reform would favour the most 
vulnerable individuals, who tend in any case to use less dental services, irrespective of dental care price. 
Second, Switzerland already has set up an effective system of protection of vulnerable individuals. According 
to LAMal, insurance premiums indeed should be reduced for people of modest economic circumstances by 
federal and cantonal contributions. The amount and nature of premium reduction and the entitlement 
conditions, however, are set by single cantons and therefore, vary widely. Overall, French-speaking cantons 
tend to be more generous than German-speaking ones. Therefore, a set of dental services (emergency 
treatment and sanitation, conservative treatment, and prosthetic restoration) is already guaranteed to low-
income individuals. For example, in the Canton of Geneva, the Service des Prestations Complémentaires 
already covers emergency care and all periodontal treatments independently of the severity of the clinical 
case. All basic operative treatments are guaranteed, such as endodontic treatments and direct composites. 
Even missing teeth are replaced by means of removable prosthesis. On the other hand, all ‘luxury 
treatments’, such as orthodontic treatments to re-align teeth, bleaching, implants, and fixed crowns, are not 
covered by this social insurance.  
The relevance of geographical factors and socio-demographic characteristics of households in 
explaining unmet needs is particularly interesting, as it suggests that, given fixed income, the socio-economic 
status and cultural factors intrinsic to each region might affect the perceived need for dental services. As the 
presence of barriers to access dental services is a crucial point raised by the proponents of the reform, it is 
necessary to pay attention to basing similar reform on considerations of the level of unmet needs alone. 
Income is not a unique driver of barriers to access dental care. The relevance of nationality and educational 
level in explaining self-reported needs might be interpreted as a need for more educational and informative 
campaigns addressed to foreign and low-educated individuals. Indeed, preventive programmes emphasising 
care for the erupting molars, the use of a firm guideline and stated goals to be achieved showed to be 
extremely effective whatever the patients’ socio-economic group (e.g.: Ekstrand and Christiansen (2005) on 
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the non-operative caries treatment programme (NOCTP) used since 1987 in the municipality of Nexö in 
Denmark).  In addition, the relevance of geographical dummies suggests that measuring barriers to access 
through a self-reported measure might suffer from perception/attitude bias intrinsic to each region (i.e. in 
this respect, Swiss Germans are apparently different from Swiss French). In particular, useful policies could 
include informative and preventive campaigns aimed at reducing the current informative gap between 
foreign- and native-born individuals and between high- and low-dental hygiene concerned individuals. 
The possible effects of the reform might be influenced by several phenomena whose impacts are hardly 
predictable. First, the aforementioned dental expenses of 4.1 billion CHF include both basic treatments 
(periodic controls, dental hygienist, prevention, and conservative caries treatment) and advanced treatments 
(bridges and crowns), but it cannot be ignored that there is potential dental care demand that is unmet 
because of household budget constraints. This sustainability analysis risks being optimistic as it completely 
ignores the likely increase in patients’ way of using dental care once it is covered by compulsory insurance 
(Manski et al., 2002). Estimating the change in demand from the introduction of compulsory insurance is a 
challenging task due to the paucity of similar international experiences. According to SHP data 4.1% of Swiss 
people without any dental insurance reported unmet needs for dental examinations and treatments during 
2014. It is reasonable to believe that a large share of people reporting unmet needs for economic reasons 
will instead be able to satisfy their demand under a compulsory insurance scheme. If we assume an additional 
cost of 41 CHF a month for 4.1% of Swiss people (i.e. those reporting unmet needs), this would lead to a 
further increase in costs equal to roughly 139 million CHF per year. Having expenses covered by insurance, it 
is likely that the demand for advanced (and costly) treatments would increase further but there are no data 
that might help in defining/quantifying the amount of such an increasevii. 
<TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE> 
Finally, the health insurance loading fee, that is, the portion of the premium that insurance companies 
use to cover general and claims-related expenses, should be taken into account. According to the Swiss 
Federal Office of Public Health (Confédération Suisse, 2016), in 2014, the premiums due for compulsory 
health insurance were 25,845 million CHF while the administrative costs were 1,287 million CHF, with the 
 15 
 
share of expenditure ranging from a minimum of 2.9% to a maximum of 14.3%, for an average 4.9%. A 
conservative scenario is to extend the 5% average health insurance loading fee to dental insurance: starting 
from the 3.5 billion CHF estimation we obtained earlier, we found that the administrative fees would be 
around 175 million CHF. 
Conclusions  
Our findings highlight the issues currently at stake in the evaluation of the eventual reform of the Swiss 
dental care system. First, income is possibly the main driver of unmet needs for dental care but not the 
unique. The association between a worse dental status and lower sociodemographic level is the effect a 
complex interaction of various risk factors. In particular, periodontal diseases and dental decay are mainly 
originated from bad oral hygiene, lack of basic cleaning procedures, and irresponsible diet and habits (e.g. 
excess of sugar-based food and smoking) that are more common in low level sociodemographic groups, the 
ones that experience economic barriers to dental care access. However, Schneider et al. (2017) outline that 
in Switzerland in the period 1992-2012 “dental status improved across all sociodemographic groups, with the 
greatest improvements being found in obese participants and in participants with the lowest incomes and 
educational levels” and that “even though dental treatment continues to be a self-paying system, the 
differences between sociodemographic groups decreased markedly”. From the non-economic barriers side, 
dental status disparity among the different sociodemographic groups could be substantially reduced funding 
preventive policies addressed to foreign individuals and low-educated people breaking-down these barriers 
to dental care access. Indeed, international literature shows that preventive dental care sessions, and NOCTP 
in particular (Ekstrand and Christiansen, 2005), substantially improve the dental health status of a 
community. On the other side, although the proponents claim that the reform represents the solution to the 
economic barriers to dental care access, it worth recalling that LAMal already provides a structured 
protection system for vulnerable individuals covering several dental services with the exception of luxury 
dental treatments. Moreover, considering that insurance coverage may lead to an increase in demand for 
dental services, if the 1% contribution is the only way that proponents of the reform suggest covering dental 
care costs (and by taking into consideration the fact that the administrative expenditure will reduce the 
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collected total amount by around 5%), the remaining annual per capita amount of 409 CHF seems to be 
inadequate to bring an improvement in public dental health. On the supply side, dentists associated with 
insurance companies might have to decrease the value of the VTP to 3.10 CHF (the ‘social tariff’ level in 
Switzerland) with a possible decrease in quality of the materials and equipment used and of the treatment 
procedures. In particular, for those cases in which the offices are located in high-priced areas, such as Zurich 
or Geneva, this fact could lead to serious problems in financing these offices.  
Therefore, the proposal for a 1% wage contribution to finance dental care insurance seems inadequate 
for the stated purpose (i.e. to guarantee all ‘free’ access to advanced dental care treatments, e.g. teeth 
replacements by means of implants, bridges, and orthodontic treatments). With the expected revenue, it 
would be possible to provide the entire population with only basic preventive 1-hour sessions with dentists 
for simple basic preventive measures, which is nowhere near being sufficiently efficient to avoid the 
development of periodontal or caries symptoms, such as periodontal pockets or carious lesions. Apart from 
this, it has to be pointed out that this kind of service could be provided in Switzerland by dental hygienists, 
whose hourly prices are around 60% cheaper than those of dentists (3.5 PP vs 9 PP for a 5 minutes session). 
A prophylaxis assistant costs roughly 65,000 CHF per year, and has capacity to work around 1,800 hours per 
year. In addition, expanding the pool of people with access to social insurance programmes might be a viable 
and cheap way to guarantee preventive and prophylaxis treatments to more adults. The additional resources 
for this counter-proposal could be financed by a tax on sugary drinks (soft drinks, fruit juices, and energy 
drinks) as well as a small increase in taxes on tobacco. Denmark has adopted best practice to support children 
and adolescents in this sense (Carvalho et al., 1991; Thylstrup et al., 1997; Ekstrand and Christiansen, 2005; 
Kuzmina and Ekstrand, 2015; Fleming, 2016). The costs of this action would be significantly lower than the 
dental insurance initiative, because the former system specifically targets the at-risk group of patients and 
primarily works with prophylaxis assistants. 
To conclude, given the available information, the expectation of ‘free’ dental care for all seems to be 
hardly achievable, except if the significant missing funds were guaranteed by cross-financing through 
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increases in general communal, cantonal, or federal taxes. Consequently, reinforcement of prevention aimed 
at preventing dental illness is preferable to treatment of the illness itself.  
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i The criteria for determining a person “indigent” are income and the number of children and differ among the 26 Swiss 
Cantons. 
ii Dental tariffs can be downloaded from: https://www.sso.ch/fr/patients/droit-et-tarif/tarif-dentaire.html 
iii During 2018 both tariff points (PP) and values (VTP) will be rescaled so that each point will cost between 1 and 1.6 
CHFs according to the dentist’s skill and expertise. 
iv The Swiss Household Panel (SHP) is based at the Swiss Centre of Expertise in the Social Sciences FORS, financed by 
the Swiss National Science Foundation. 
v In the analyses, microdata have been weighted to be representative of the Swiss population. 
vi Due to missing data on income, the total number of observations used in regression models drops to 6,700. 
vii Due to the lack of survey or administrative data on the demand and expenses for basic and advanced dental 
treatments, it is not possible to know what proportion of patients used advanced dental care services. Consequently, 
the estimations herein proposed are based on simple averages and should be read with caution. 
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Figure Legends 




Table 1: Variables used in the logistic regressions 
Variable 
Name 
Description Note Models 
UNMET NEED 
Dependent indicator variable = 1 if the 
household reported  
unmet needs for dental care. 
The variable assumes value one if the 
respondent declares that he/she cannot Go to 
the dentist if needed. 
1-4 
INCOME 
Yearly household equivalised net income (in 
thousands of CHF). SKOS equivalence scale 
has been used. 
The SKOS scale attributes a weight of 1 to a 1-
person household, 1.53 to a two-person 
household, 1.86 to a three-person household, 
2.14 to a four-person household, 2.42 to a 
five-person household, 2.70 to a six-person 
household, 2.98 to a seven-person household 
and increases by 0.28 to each additional 
person. 
1, 3, 4 
REGIONAL 
DUMMIES 
7 dummy variables, one for each Swiss region 
(Lake Geneva; Middleland; North-west 
Switzerland; Zurich; East Switzerland; Central 
Switzerland; Ticino). 
The dummy variable relative to Lake Geneva 
has been omitted to avoid collinearity and 
therefore, Lake Geneva represents the 
reference region. 
2, 3, 4 
NC Number of components in the household.  4 
NOTURBAN 
Dummy variable = 1 if the household is in a 
rural or not urban area. 
Not urban areas include = Peripheral urban 
communes; Rural commuter communes, 




Average number of years of education among 
family components aged 18 years or more. 
 4 
UNEMPLOYED 
Dummy variable = 1 if at least one member of 
the household is unemployed. 
 4 
FOREIGN 
Dummy variable = 1 if at least one member of 







Table 2: Percentage of households reporting unmet needs for dental examination or treatment in 2014 




















Lake Geneva (VD, VS, GE) 7.8 27.1 19.8 1,154 
Middleland (BE, FR, SO, NE, JU) 3.2 25.3 7.8 1,695 
North-west Switzerland (BS, BL, AG) 3.5 22.1 10.0 953 
Zurich (ZH) 2.7 22.2 8.9 1,128 
East Switzerland  (GL, SH, AR, AI, 
SG,GR, TG) 
3.7 27.4 6.4 857 
Central Switzerland (LU, UR, SZ, OW, 
NW, ZG) 
1.7 22.3 4.1 660 
Ticino (TI) 9.3 39.3 16.4 253 
Total 4.1 25.2 10.6 6,700 
Source: Swiss Household Panel, year 2014. 
Notes: data have been weighted to the Swiss population; income refers to yearly household equivalized 




Table 3: Results of the logistic regressions in terms of odds ratio 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio Odds Ratio 
INCOME 0.957 ***   0.957 *** 0.963 *** 
 (0.000)    (0.000)  (0.000)  
MIDDLELAND   0.385 *** 0.361 *** 0.413 *** 
   (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  
NORTH-WEST  SWITZERLAND 
 
0.428 *** 0.457 *** 0.505 *** 
 (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005)  
ZURICH  0.321 *** 0.347 *** 0.384 *** 
   (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.005)  
EAST SWITZERLAND  0.446 *** 0.422 *** 0.484 *** 
   (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  
CENTRAL SWITZERLAND  0.204 *** 0.212 *** 0.260 *** 
   (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  
TICINO  1.199 *** 0.856 *** 0.738 *** 
   (0.013)  (0.009)  (0.008)  
NC      0.809 *** 
       (0.002)  
NOTURBAN      0.726 *** 
       (0.004)  
EDUCATION      0.939 *** 
       (0.001)  
UNEMPLOYED       1.983 *** 
       (0.023)  
FOREIGN      3.134 *** 
       (0.020)  
CONSTANT 0.407 *** 0.085 *** 0.788 *** 1.180 *** 
 (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.007)  (0.020)  
ROC Area 0.771 0.618 0.783 0.815 
Number of observations 6,700 6,700 6,700 6,700 
Chi2 test p-value for 
differences in ROC areas 
1.3e+05  *** 




Table 4: Gross monthly wage and workforce by age and gender and estimated contributions 
Age 
Workforce (x 1000) 
Estimated average  
monthly wage 
1% contribution per year ( x 1000) 
Men Women Total Men Women Total Men Women Total 
15–24 282 282 564 4,761 4,518 4,640 161,110 152,893 314,004 
25–39 782 684 1,466 6,091 5,594 5,859 571,542 459,154 1,030,695 
40–54 887 774 1,661 7,418 6,310 6,902 789,612 586,060 1,375,672 
55–64 399 338 737 8,113 6,403 7,329 388,442 259,715 648,158 
65+ 105 67 172 9,731 6,473 8,462 122,613 52,043 174,656 
Total 2,455 2,145 4,600 6,902 5,866 6,419 2,033,320 1,509,865 3,543,185 
Sources: Gross monthly wage is from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office, Enquête Suisse sur la 
population active (ESPA, 2015) and workforce by age and gender is from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office 
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